Abstract-In multimedia crowdsourcing, the requester's quality requirements and reward decisions will affect the workers' task selection strategies and the quality of their multimedia contributions. In this paper, we present a first study on how the workers' bounded cognitive rationality interacts with and affects the decisions and performance of a multimedia crowdsourcing system. Specifically, we consider a two-stage model, where a requester first determines the reward and the quality requirement for each task, and the workers select the tasks to accomplish accordingly. First, we consider the benchmark case where users are fully rational, and derive the requester's optimal rewards and quality requirements for the tasks. Furthermore, we focus on the more practical bounded rational case by modeling the workers' task selection behaviors using the cognitive hierarchy theory. Comparing with the fully rational benchmark, we show that the requester can increase her profit by taking advantage of the workers' bounded cognitive rationality, especially when the workers' population is large or the workers' average cognitive level is low. When the workers' average cognitive level is very high, however, the equilibrium under the practical bounded rational model converges to that under the benchmark fully rational model. It is because the workers at different levels make decisions sequentially and high cognitive level workers can accurately predict other users' strategies. Under both the fully and bounded rational models, we show that if workers are heterogeneous but one type of workers (either the high or the low quality) dominates the platform, the requester cannot make a higher profit by setting different quality requirements for different tasks.
can reveal the full potential of crowdsourcing, which may revolutionize many areas in our daily life, such as health care, transportation, and multimedia consumption. Multimedia crowdsourcing [3] , which is a special kind of mobile crowdsourcing for images, audios, and videos, possesses great benefits in areas such as online education, social networking, and environment monitoring. For instance, multimedia crowdsourcing for traffic monitoring can reveal more details than non-multimedia measurements. When an accident occurs, the real-time pictures and videos can help rescuers better estimate the number of people trapped in a particular area more accurately in advance.
Today's multimedia crowdsourcing platforms (e.g., Foap [4] ) make it possible to hire workers worldwide to accomplish a common task. In such a system, a requester is usually responsible for publishing tasks together with the corresponding rewards and quality requirements, so that the workers can claim and complete the tasks to earn these rewards. For instance, some travel platforms (e.g., Ctrip [5] and KLOOK [6] ) would like to hire some individuals to collect photos or write traveling notes at some scenic spots, aiming at enriching their photo bases and enhancing their reputation. Those photographers who produce photos with good resolution and location choices will be rewarded with some coupons or even cash [7] . To achieve her desirable outcome, a requester needs to properly design an incentive mechanism on how much reward to give, how to set the quality requirement, and how to share the reward.
Due to the dynamic and distributed characteristics of the multimedia sources (e.g., audios, videos, and graphics), multimedia crowdsourcing imposes more stringent quality requirements than usual mobile crowdsensing applications, hence poses new challenges for the incentive mechanism design. For example, Ctrip prefers photos and travel notes with high quality (i.e., carefully designed photos and elaborated written notes) and aims to recruit professional photographers to upload high quality pictures. To achieve this, Ctrip publishes some photo-taking tasks with high rewards and high quality requirements to attract the high quality workers to complete these particular tasks [8] . If the requester sets the requirement too high, however, there will be fewer eligible workers, who can complete these tasks, and it might negatively affect the eventual goal of the requester. Thereby, crowdsourcing based multimedia applications involve a complex tradeoff among the rewards, quality requirements, and the workers' participation. However, most existing studies (e.g., [9] [10] [11] [12] ) only focus on the reward design without considering the quality requirements.
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Furthermore, regarding the workers' participation, existing literature on incentive mechanism designs in crowdsourcing (including multimedia crowdsourcing) usually consider the fully rational workers (e.g., [13] [14] [15] [16] ), who have the same infinite cognitive levels of reasoning other workers' decisions when choosing their own. As a result, the workers' interactions in terms of the task selections are formulated as a noncooperative game, with the Nash equilibrium (NE) being the most widely used solution concept [17] . However, extensive experimental studies in psychology have shown that people often have cognitive limits when making their reasoning decisions (e.g., [18] [19] [20] ). Hence it is more accurate to consider the bounded rational workers, who have heterogeneous and finite cognitive levels of reasoning about the others' decisions. The cognitive heterogeneity of the workers exerts a great impact on their data collecting decisions, and eventually influences the requester's multimedia information and quality. Several recent works in crowdsourcing start to challenge the assumption of full rationality (e.g., [21] [22] [23] ). However, they do not take the quality of data into account, which is crucial for the multimedia crowdsourcing applications.
One widely adopted theory that mathematically characterizes the players' limited cognitive capacities is the cognitive hierarchy (CH) theory [18] (which is part of the behavioral game theory). Under the CH theory, the players, who are categorized into different cognitive levels, reason in a progressive manner to achieve the cognitive hierarchy equilibrium. More specifically, the level-0 (lowest cognitive level) players select their strategies randomly without predicting the choices of the other players. A level-1 player, who is one cognitive level higher than the level-0 player, makes his choice by predicting other users' choices by assuming that all the other players are level-0 players. In general, a level-k player assumes that the other players are distributed according to a normalized Poisson distribution [18] from level-0 to level-(k−1) in the population, and makes his decision by anticipating the other players' decisions. This means that a level-k player can accurately estimate the relative proportions of all the lower level players, but ignores the fact that there can be other players at the same or higher levels than his. By analyzing the workers' behaviors from level-0 to level-∞ progressively, we can compute the total number of workers selecting each task. The CH theory has been very successful at explaining deviations from the NE for a wide range of applications, such as marketing [20] , business [24] , and network science [25] . Abuzainab et al. [26] apply the CH theory in resource allocation problems, which is the first studying incorporating the CH theory in the field of networking. Inspired by this idea, we introduce the CH theory into our multimedia crowdsourcing framework.
As the first paper on modeling the workers' limited cognitive reasoning capability in multimedia crowdsourcing, we consider a simple model where a single requester recruits some workers to complete multiple tasks. Different tasks involve different completion costs, and generate different revenues for a requester, if completed with different qualities. We derive the requester's optimal rewards and quality requirements, as well as workers' task selection equilibrium in both the benchmark fully rational (FR) model and the bounded rational (BR) model. We summarize the key results and contributions of this paper as follows:
• Novel crowdsourcing model with the CH theory: To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that applies the CH theory in multimedia crowdsourcing systems, which integrates the quality requirements of tasks and the cognitive heterogeneity of workers.
• Optimal and near-optimal solutions to the FR benchmark:
Under the FR model, we can compute the requester's optimal task reward and quality settings and the homogeneous workers' NE. For the case of heterogeneous worker quality capabilities, we propose a low-complexity heuristic algorithm to compute the near-optimal solutions of a mixed integer programming problem.
• Theoretical and numerical analysis in the BR model:
Under the BR model, we show that the task selection equilibrium converges to the FR benchmark in the limiting case when the workers' average cognitive level is high enough. Under the more realistic case of a finite average cognitive level, however, the requester can increase her profit by reducing the reward and taking advantage of the workers with low reasoning capabilities, especially under a large population and a low average cognitive level.
• Exploiting workers' heterogeneity in quality: With heterogeneous workers, the requester can increase her profit by choosing different quality requirements under both the FR and BR models. When a single quality capability workers dominate the platform, however, the benefit of quality requirement differentiation disappears, because the rest of the workers are not enough to make a difference.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In Section II-A, we provide a high-level discussion of the multimedia crowdsourcing system. Then we introduce the decisions of the requester and the workers in two stages: the requester determines the rewards and quality requirements in Stage I (Section II-B), and the workers decide which task to select in Stage II (Section II-C).
A. Multimedia Crowdsourcing Setting
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a system where a requester announces M tasks on the crowdsourcing platform. The requester associates task m ∈ M = {1, · · · , M} with a reward R m ≥ 0 and a quality requirement Q m ≥ 0. For example, the requester publishes some photo collecting tasks at some scenic locations and announces the rewards together with the photo quality requirements. Let N = {1, · · · , N} be the set of workers who are active on this multimedia crowdsourcing platform. We refer to the requester as "she" and a worker as "he" in the rest of the paper.
As in most multimedia crowdsourcing systems, the requester has a larger market power and makes the decisions before the workers do. Thus, the workers can only treat the requester's decisions as fixed when optimizing their own decisions. Hence we model the interactions in the system as a two-stage game. First, the requester sets the rewards and quality requirements, in order to attract enough workers to A two-stage multimedia crowdsourcing model. In Stage I, the requester sets rewards R to incentivize the workers to put effort in M tasks, together with quality requirements Q. In Stage II, a worker can select to complete one of the tasks or not to participate. Eligible workers (i.e., with equal or higher quality capacities than the requirement) who select the same task will equally share the corresponding reward for that task.
complete these tasks with the goal of profit maximization (details in Section II-B). Next, each worker determines whether to participate and if yes which task to select, in order to maximize his payoff (details in Section II-C). We assume that a worker can only complete one task. 1 
B. Stage I: Requester's Profit Maximization Problem
In Stage I, we assume that the requester is fully rational 2 and determines the rewards R = (R m , ∀m ∈ M) and the quality requirements Q = (Q m , ∀m ∈ M) for M tasks to maximize her profit. In Stage II, given rewards R and quality requirements Q, the number of workers who are both eligible (with equal or higher quality capabilities than the requirement) and decide to choose task m ∈ M is N m (R, Q), which will be derived under the FR and BR models in Section III and Section IV, respectively.
Let U m (Q m N m ) be the requester's revenue function of task m ∈ M, which increases with both the quality threshold Q m and the number of workers N m selecting task m. First, since the quality requirement determines the minimum quality level of the submitted photos, the contents' quality and hence the requester's revenue increase with Q m . Second, when there are more workers collecting data for this task, the requester can have better multimedia contents to select from and hence achieve a higher revenue (e.g., when using these photos to attract future travelers). To capture the diminishing marginal return of the additional quality and number of workers, we assume that
In Stage I, the requester determines the rewards and quality requirements to maximize her profit (i.e., revenue minus reward) over the M tasks by considering Problem (1):
C. Stage II: Workers' Task Selection Problem
In Stage II, for each worker in set N , he needs to decide whether and which task to select. We define q n as worker n's quality capability related to his skills and the functionalities of his photographing devices (e.g., smartphones, cameras, and GoPros). The value of q n is independent of the tasks that he selects. Then we define an eligible task set for worker n as
Let s n ∈ {0} ∪ M be worker n's strategy, where s n = 0 represents not selecting any task, and s n = m represents selecting task m ∈ M. When a worker selects (and completes) a task m ∈ M, he will incur a cost of c m ≥ 0. We assume that the cost is task dependent but not worker dependent. When multiple workers select to complete the same task m, the requester will equally divide the reward among all N m workers. 4 Hence the payoff of a worker n is
To maximize his payoff, a worker in Stage II will anticipate other worker's strategies, and makes his decision accordingly. In the FR case, workers will have an infinite reasoning capability and accurately predict the others' behaviors based on (2). We will formulate the user interactions as a non-cooperative game and derive the NE solution in Section III. In the BR case, however, we consider the more realistic assumption that workers have different and limited cognitive levels and may have wrong beliefs about the others' strategies. We derive the cognitive hierarchy equilibrium (CHE) in Section IV.
III. FULLY RATIONAL MODEL
In this section, we consider the case when the workers are fully rational. In Section III-A, we formulate the task selection game in Stage II. By incorporating workers' sufficient and necessary NE conditions in Stage I, we reformulate the requester's profit optimization problem in Section III-B. Then we present the requester's optimal reward and quality requirement settings for homogeneous workers, and propose a low-complexity heuristic algorithm to compute the near-optimal solutions for heterogeneous workers in Section III-C.
A. Workers' Non-cooperative Task Selection in Stage II
1) Non-Cooperative Task Selection Game: Workers make their task selection decisions through participating a non-cooperative game, where one worker's payoff depends on the choices of all the other workers.
Workers' Task Selection Game: The Stage II's task selection game is a tuple Ω = (N , S, Π) defined by:
• Players: The set of workers N .
• Strategies: Each worker n ∈ N selects a strategy s n ∈ S n {0} ∪ M. The strategy profile of all workers is s = (s n , ∀n ∈ N ). The set of feasible strategy profile of all workers is S = × n∈N S n .
• Payoffs: Each worker n ∈ N maximizes his payoff as defined in (2) . The vector Π(s, R, Q) = (π n (s, R, Q), ∀n ∈ N ) contains the payoff functions of all workers. 2) Nash Equilibrium: For worker n, given the rewards R, the quality requirements Q, and other workers' strategy profile s −n , he aims to maximize his payoff in (2):
Under a given s −n , there can beN m = |{k ∈ N \{n} :
The fixed point of all the workers' best response choices is the Nash equilibrium (NE), where no worker can improve his payoff by deviating from his task choice unilaterally.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium): Under fixed rewards R and quality requirements Q, a strategy profile s NE is an NE of game Ω if
We can write the number of workers selecting task m at the NE s NE under rewards R and quality requirement Q m as
3) Analysis: We will focus on the case when workers have heterogeneous quality capabilities, which includes the case of homogeneous model as a special case.
In the heterogeneous model, some workers possess high quality capabilities and are eligible for completing both high and low quality requirement tasks, while other workers who are less capable can only choose to complete low quality requirement tasks. When workers do not have any differences in terms of capabilities, they are homogeneous. The reason behind this difference is due to workers' different skills and the capabilities of their photographing devices.
More specifically, we assume that the workers have two quality capabilities. 6 Without loss of generality, we assume that the N H workers in the high quality capability set N H = {1, · · · , N H } have a quality q H , and the remaining N − N H workers in the low quality capability set N L = {N H + 1, · · · , N} have a quality q L < q H . If there exists a task m ∈ M such that Q m > q H , then none of the workers are eligible for this task and N m = 0. This means that the requester will never choose a Q m larger than q H .
For the high quality capability workers with q H , they are eligible to complete task m with 0 ≤ Q m ≤ q H , while low quality capability workers with q L can only select low quality requirement task m with 0 ≤ Q m ≤ q L . Hence, we have the quality threshold q L and then we further define the high quality task set M H = {m ∈ M : q L < Q m ≤ q H } only for high quality capability workers, and the low quality task set M L = {m ∈ M : 0 ≤ Q m ≤ q L } which both high and low quality capability workers can select from.
Note that if we have N H = 0, then all the workers have the same low quality capability, and the heterogeneous setting degenerates to the homogeneous case. In this case, no workers are eligible for the high quality requirement tasks, and the requester will choose M H = ∅ accordingly.
Next we characterize the NE strategies of the Workers' Task Selection Game, under the fixed rewards and requirements.
Proposition 1: Given rewards R and quality requirements Q, the numbers 7 
For a high quality worker who selects task m, constraint (7a) illustrates that he always receives a payoff of
If such a high quality worker changes to select another task i, he will receive a payoff of
Hence, a high quality worker selecting task m has no incentive to change his strategy. If not all the high quality workers participate (i.e., m∈M N NE H,m < N H ), then we have λ 1 = 0 from constraint (7b), which shows that a high quality worker who does not participate will never change to select a task because of the zero payoff. These constraints together show the high quality workers' NE tasks selections.
For a low quality worker, he is not eligible to select a task with a high quality requirement as shown in constraint (7c). Constraint (7d) illustrates that a low quality worker selecting task m ∈ M L has no incentive to change his strategy because he always receives a payoff of λ 2 ≥ 0. If not all the low quality workers participate, then we have λ 2 = 0 from constraint (7e), which shows that a low quality worker who does not participate will never change to select a task because of the zero payoff of selecting a task. These constraints together show the low quality workers' NE tasks selections. The detailed proof of Proposition 1 is given in [29] .
Note that the feasible region of variables λ 1 and N
NE H
in conditions (7b) and (7f) is a union of two convex sets, 8 which is non-convex in general. Given rewards and quality requirements, the feasible set of the corresponding NE is fixed but cannot be computed easily [30] . Instead, we directly incorporate these relationships as constraints into the requester's profit maximizing problem and formulate a bilevel optimization problem in Section III-B.
B. Bilevel Optimization
In this subsection, we incorporate the necessary and sufficient conditions (7a)-(7f) into Problem (1) in Stage I and form a bilevel optimization problem [30] . This enables the requester to compute his optimal choices of rewards and quality requirements in Stage I in (1) by considering the worker's selections in Stage II.
Due to the non-convex feasible region of the variables in (7a)-(7f), Problem (8) is non-convex and is difficult to solve. Nevertheless, we can exploit the special structure of the crowdsourcing problem and simplify the problem formulation. 9 In Proposition 2, we introduce an alternative characterization of the constraints in Problem (8) to simply the problem.
Proposition 2: The rewards R NE * and the quality requirements Q NE * in Stage I are optimal for Problem (8) only if 8 We have
which is a union of two convex sets. 9 We can show that the feasible region is a union of two convex sets. We then compute the optimal solution that achieves the maximum profit on the two convex sets separately. Then we compare these results and derive the optimal rewards and quality requirements.
Since the requester knows the workers' quality capabilities, condition (9a) indicates that it is optimal for her to differentiate the tasks with quality requirements and directly set the requirement Q NE * m equal to the workers' quality capabilities. Hence the requester can take advantage of all the workers and fully utilize their quality capabilities. Conditions (9b) and (9c) together determine the optimal rewards, which are just enough to compensate all the task-selecting workers' operation costs. As a result, any worker who selects a task will achieve a zero payoff, regardless of his quality capability and the task that he selects (including the choice of not to participate). The proof of Proposition 2 is given in [29] .
Proposition 2 shows the necessary conditions of the requester's optimal rewards and quality requirements in Stage I. Note that if conditions (9a)-(9c) hold, then all the constraints in Problem (8) Based on the discussions, we reformulate Problem (8) :
Note that Problem (10) is a mixed integer non-linear programming (MINLP) problem, which cannot be solved in polynomial time in general [32] . Thus, we propose a low-complexity heuristic algorithm to solve the problem in Section III-C.
C. Low-Complexity Heuristic Algorithm to Solve Problem (10)
In this subsection, we aim to solve Problem (10) using the following idea. First, once the set M H is fixed (i.e., y m is determined, ∀m ∈ M), we notice that the problem reduces to a convex problem (11) below. Hence, the maximum profit under a fixed M H can be calculated effectively [33] . Second, we propose a low-complexity heuristic algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1) to compute several candidates of the set M H and select the one achieving the highest profit as the near-optimal task set M N −OP T H . 10 10 The simulation results in [29] show that Algorithm 1 can achieve a good performance, where the profit is close to that under the optimal settings (achieved by an exhaustive search). Hence, we refer to our task set M
N−OP T H
as the near-optimal solution.
First, let us consider the following reduced problem under a fixed high quality task set M H :
Note that for the case of homogeneous workers, we have N H = 0 and M H = ∅. Hence we can directly compute the optimal solutions to the convex problem (11) as N NE * , and have the optimal rewards R NE * and quality requirements Q NE * from Proposition 2.
For the case of heterogeneous workers, we further define the optimal solutions to the convex Problem (11) asN (M H ). Then, the maximum profit under this fixed M H can be calculated by applyingN (M H ) into the objective function (11a), which we define as Π(M H ,N (M H )).
Next we will derive the optimal set M H in order to solve Problem (10) . Note that there are totally 2 M feasible choices of M H , hence the complexity of finding M H through the exhaustive search is high. Since the requester in crowdsourcing applications usually needs a fast algorithm in the task assignment process (e.g., real-time tasks such as emergency response [34] ), we propose the heuristic Algorithm 1 with a polynomial time complexity O(M 2 ) to achieve a suboptimal performance. Initialization: We initialize the maximum profit M axP ro to be zero (line 1).
Iteration process: At each iteration, we determine the task set M H by adding different tasks and compute the corresponding profit. If the task set has a higher profit than that of the previous task sets, then we adopt the new task set M H as the near-optimal set M N −OP T H .
• Preliminary: At the beginning of each iteration, we form a new task set M H = ∅ and compute the corresponding profit prof it (line 3).
• Greedy randomized task set search: When adding task j into the task set M H (line 6), we can calculate the profit P j (line 7). Then, based on the greedy randomized adaptive search technique [35] , we restrict the feasible task candidate set J * to be the set that includes all new tasks with profit no smaller than P * = P l + α(P h − P l ) (line 8). 11 We then randomly select a task j * ∈ J * and add task j * into the task set M H (line 9).
• New task set update: If the new task set M H has a profit higher than that of the previous task set (without task j * ) (line 10), then we update the task set (line 11) 11 Here α ∈ [0, 1] is the adaptive rate. α = 1 corresponds to a greedy algorithm which only adopts a new task generating the highest profit at each iteration, while α = 0 corresponds to a totally random selection process. Since a greedy algorithm cannot escape from a local optimal solution, and a randomized process needs more iterations to find a good performance solution [35] , we adopt α = 0.5 in our simulations. More discussions on the impact of α and maxIter values on the convergence and optimality is given in [29] . Table I .
IV. BOUNDED RATIONAL MODEL
Extensive experimental studies have shown that people have cognitive limits when making their decisions (e.g., [18] [19] [20] ). Instead of making the often unrealistic full rationality assumption, in this section we consider the more practical BR We model both the homogeneous and heterogeneous workers' behaviors based on the CH theory in Section IV-A, and theoretically compare the workers' NE and CHE task selections given the same rewards and task requirements in Section IV-B. Specifically, we prove that the FR model is a limiting case of the BR model when the average cognitive level τ approaches ∞ (i.e., all the users have an infinite reasoning capacity). 13 
A. Workers' Task Selections in Stage II: Cognitive Hierarchy
To maximize his payoff in (2), a worker in Stage II consider choosing a task from set M. If R m < c m for task m, a worker will never select that task as his payoff will be negative. Hence, for the rest of the paper, we will focus on the non-trivial case of R m ≥ c m for each task m ∈ M.
Next, we model the BR case based on the CH theory [18] , where workers with different cognitive thinking levels make decisions differently based on different beliefs of the other workers' choices. We introduce the basic ideas of the CH theory similar as in [18] :
(1) The total worker population can be divided into an infinite number of levels, indexed by k = 0, 1, · · · , ∞. The number of workers at each level k follows a Poisson distribution [18] 
−τ with a rate τ . The value of τ represents the average cognitive level. For example, a larger τ may reflect a higher average worker education level.
(2) A level-k (k ≥ 1) worker knows the accurate relative ratios among workers at lower rationality levels, f (h) for all 0 ≤ h ≤ k − 1, and can accurately predict their behaviors, but ignores the existence of other level-k and higher level workers. More specifically, a level-k worker's belief about the fraction
, where the subscript "k" denotes that such belief is unique to the level-k worker. Furthermore, a level-k worker believes that he is the only one with the highest cognitive capability in the population, i.e., he is the only level-k worker in the population, and there are no workers higher than level-k.
14 Hence for any 13 Note that this convergence is not generally true in the CH theory [18] . For example, some of the games do not have any NE. Some games have multiple NEs, but the CHE only converges to a particular NE [20] . 14 
Algorithm 2: Task Selection Algorithm based on CH
Input: Rewards R; quality requirements Q; costs c; average cognitive level τ ; total number of workers N ; worker number of high quality workers N H ; task set M; tolerant error . h ≥ k, we have g k (h) = 0. A level-k worker believes that level-h workers account for g k (h) fraction of the population. (3) Based on the discussions of (1) and (2), we can compute the choices of workers at different levels progressively. Given R m ≥ c m , a level-0 worker believes that he will get a non-negative payoff no matter which task to select (as he ignores the choices of any other worker in the population), hence he will select an eligible task randomly. A level-k worker will select a task that leads to the maximum payoff (including the choice of not participating), considering the task selections of all other workers (which are assumed to be at lower levels).
Given any arbitrary rewards R and quality requirements Q in Stage I, we propose a progressive task selection algorithm 15 (i.e., Algorithm 2) motivated by the idea from [18] , and compute the CHE (N CHE ) in Stage II. Notice that the application setting in [18] is different from here: the players only decide whether to participate or not in [18] , while workers have more task selection choices in our model.
Preliminary:
Given the quality requirements, we compute the task set M H and M L with high and low quality requirements respectively (line 1).
Initialization: We initialize workers' cognitive level as k = 0, the total fractions of workers that have been considered by level-k workers as T F = 0 (line 2). We initialize the number of high and low quality workers selecting task m as n H m = 0 and n L m = 0 respectively (line 2). We initialize the fraction of level-0 workers with high and low quality capabilities selecting task m as e H (0, m) and e L (0, m), respectively (line 2).
Iteration process: At iteration k, we compute the number of level-k workers selecting a task m ∈ M. Given the task selections of level-0 to level-k workers, a level-(k + 1) worker can compute his expected payoff if he selects a task m ∈ M.
• Expected payoffs: We compute level-k workers' fraction f (k) (line 4) and the number of workers selecting task m (line 6). Then each level-(k + 1) worker believes that the number of workers selecting a task
Then he computes his expected payoff E(k, m) when task m has a high (or low, respectively) requirement (line 8 or line 10, respectively).
• Selecting tasks: For workers in level-(k + 1) with low (or high, respectively) quality capabilities, they will select the tasks with maximum payoff. In other words, if task m is in the optimal task set and the payoff is nonnegative, then there will be 
B. What is the Connection Between the FR and BR Models?
In this section, we show that the theoretically elegant FR model widely used in the literature is a limiting case of the more practical BR model (as τ approaches ∞) in the context of our crowdsourcing system. 17 This means that the insights derived by the vast incentive mechanism design literature for crowdsourcing are still good approximations of the reality when the workers have sufficiently high reasoning capabilities (although this is not always true in practice).
For a fair comparison regarding the workers' choices between the FR and BR models, we will set the same R and Q in Stage I for both the FR and BR models. Then we derive and compare the number of workers selecting task m ∈ M in Stage II, which we will denote as N (R, Q) . Theorem 1 shows that if the rewards are high enough for all the workers to participate under the FR case, then the same rewards will also motivate all the BR workers to participate. The detailed proof is given in [29] .
2) Heterogeneous Worker Quality Capabilities: When the workers have heterogeneous quality capabilities, high quality workers can select all the tasks, while the low quality ones can only select the tasks with low quality requirements. Now we discuss the workers' behaviors in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: Consider the case where the number of heterogeneous workers selecting tasks at the NE satisfies m∈M N NE m (R, Q) = N . If we choose the same R and Q in the BR case, then every high quality worker will participate by selecting one of the M tasks in the BR case (i.e., s n = 0, ∀n ∈ N H ).
Theorem 2 shows that even if the rewards are high enough to motivate all the workers, only high quality workers are guaranteed to participate in the BR case. The detailed proof is given in [29] .
Although we are not able to theoretically prove the convergence of CHE to the NE under the heterogeneous workers case and the case of m∈M N NE m (R, Q) < N, we have numerically validated this property through extensive simulations under various system parameters [29] . To sum up, the above theoretical and empirical studies show that the FR model is a limiting case of the BR model, when the average cognitive level τ approaches infinity.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the numerical results to demonstrate the performance of our multimedia crowdsourcing solution. We first illustrate the requester's optimal rewards and quality requirements in Section V-A. Then, we further numerically compare the FR and BR models in Section V-B.
Unless specified otherwise, we will use the utility function
A. Optimal Rewards and Quality Requirements in Stage I
In this subsection, we focus on the requester's optimal rewards and quality requirements in Stage I.
Note that the requester's optimization problem in (1) is the same for both the FR and BR cases. Due to the progressive nature of Algorithm 2 in determining the task selection, it is difficult to solve Problem 1 in closed-form in the BR case. 
1) Numerical Example on Homogeneous Worker Quality Capabilities:
In this case, the optimal quality requirement for any task m is Q CHE * m = q L . So we focus on characterizing how the optimal reward R CHE * m changes in the total number of workers N and the average cognitive level τ .
In Fig. 2 , we first plot the optimal task 1 reward R
NE * 1
against N in the FR model as a benchmark. As we can see, R NE * 1 first increases with N and then remains unchanged. With a small worker population (i.e., N ≤ 30), the requester wants to attract more workers to complete the task. As N further increases, however, the marginal revenue of attracting an additional worker becomes smaller and eventually cannot compensate the cost, and the requester will not increase the reward to attract them as R monotonically increases as well. In this case, the requester wants to attract more workers to complete the task.
(ii) When N reaches a threshold (i.e., N = 90), the requester is able to reduce the reward, because she anticipates there are more low cognitive level workers who always participate. Then she can afford to provide a smaller reward just for the purpose of attracting the high level workers.
(iii) As N becomes very large (e.g., N ≥ 200), the optimal reward remains unchanged and equal to the cost c 1 . In this case, as there are many level-0 workers in the population, it is enough for the requester just to attract and exploit these cheap labors to complete the task.
Comparing the three curves with different τ values, a higher τ value makes it more difficult for the requester to exploit the workers. For specifically, the threshold for the requester to reduce the reward to R CHE * m = c m are N = 50, 90, and 200 for τ = 1, 1.5, and 2, respectively. 
Observation 1:
The requester can take advantage of low cognitive level workers by setting smaller optimal rewards than the FR case, especially under a low average cognitive level and a large worker population.
2) Numerical Example on Heterogeneous Worker Quality Capabilities: When the workers have heterogeneous quality capabilities, the impacts of N and τ are similar to the homogeneous case. Hence, we will focus on how the number of high quality workers N H affects the requester's decisions. We fix N = 20, τ = 1.5, q H = 2, q L = 1, and plot the requester's optimal decisions with respect to N H in Fig. 3 .
In Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) , we plot the optimal reward R CHE * 1 and quality requirements Q CHE * against N H , respectively. In Fig. 3(c) , we plot the optimal quality requirements Q NE * against N H to compare the FR and BR models. We will first consider the CHE case in Fig. 3(a) and Fig. 3(b) , depending on the value of N H : (i) When N H is very small (i.e., 1 ≤ N H ≤ 3), Fig. 3 (b) shows that it is optimal not to set any tasks with a high quality. If the requester chooses a high quality requirement for a task, then the number of eligible workers is small, which generates a lower profit than the low requirement case.
(ii) When N H = 4, the requester is able to take advantage of the high quality workers. However, N H is still not large enough, and the effect of having high number of workers also dominates the profit generation process. Fig. 3(a) shows that the requester chooses to set a high quality requirement for task 3 with the lowest utility parameter (u m ), while keeping the quality requirements of other two tasks low (so that they can attract enough workers). Fig. 3(a) shows that the reward for task 1 drops at N H = 4, as there are fewer workers that the request can incentivize.
(iii) As N H becomes larger (e.g., N H = 5), the effect of high quality begins to dominate the profit generation process. It is better for the requester to choose the high quality requirement for tasks with high utility parameters. Fig. 3(b) shows that as N H increases, eventually the requester sets high quality requirements for all three tasks. Fig. 3(a) shows that the reward for task 1 drops a few times, corresponding to the instances where the competitions among tasks increase and the number of workers interested in task 1 reduces.
When comparing Fig. 3(b) with Fig. 3(c) , we note that the optimal task quality requirements under the BR case are similar to that under the FR case. This indicates that the requester can exploit workers' heterogeneity by setting different task quality requirements, regardless of the workers' reasoning capabilities (e.g., 4 ≤ N H ≤ 12). When a single (i.e., high or low) quality capability workers dominate the platform (e.g., 13 ≤ N H ≤ 20), however, the benefit of quality requirement differentiation disappears, because the number of the rest of the workers (with a different quality capability than the majority workers) is too small to make a difference.
When N H is very small (e.g., 1 ≤ N H ≤ 3 in Fig. 3(c) ), consider the case where the requester chooses to set a high quality requirement for task 3. Under the FR model, all the high quality capability workers will focus on this task, and the profit is higher than the case where the requester set a low quality requirement for task 3. Under the BR model, however, level-0 (including the high quality capability) workers always randomly select tasks, hence setting a high quality requirement for task 3 will not improve the requester's profit.
Observation 2: Under both the FR and BR models, it is profitable for the requester to differentiate the tasks with different quality requirements, unless a single type of workers dominates the platform.
B. Profit Comparison of the FB and BR Models
Now we focus on the profit comparison between the FR and BR models. We will show that the requester can take advantage of the BR model and obtain a higher level of profit.
We , ∀m ∈ M) for simplicity. In the BR model, we set τ = 5. In the following, we will consider two different cases, depending on whether R and Q are the same in both models.
1) The Requester Sets the Same Rewards and Quality Requirements: In the first scenario, we assume that the requester sets the same rewards R N −OP T and quality requirements Q N −OP T in Stage I (both for the FR and BR models), and plot the number of workers selecting tasks for both models. This allows us to achieve a fair comparison in terms of the workers' behaviors in Stage II. Due to page limit, the detailed discussions are given in [29] .
2) The Requester Can Set Different Profit Maximizing Rewards and Quality Requirements: Next we consider a second scenario where the requester can freely choose her profit maximizing rewards and requirements in Stage I to maximize her payoff, which leads to the corresponding NE and CHE. Fig. 4 illustrates the maximum total profits in the FR and BR models.
When N is small (i.e., N ≤ 20), the maximum profits in both models are the same and increase with N . This is because the optimal rewards in the BR and FR models are the same. Given the same rewards, workers behave similarly in the FR and BR models, hence the requester cannot increase her profit in the BR model. the profit in the BR model goes up unboundedly with the total number N . This is because as N increases, there are more level-0 workers, hence eventually the requester can simply set R m = c m and relies on the increasing number of level-0 workers to accomplish these tasks.
Observation 3:
The profit in the BR model increases unboundedly with the number of workers, while it saturates in the FR model.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented the first study regarding how the bounded cognitive rationality (i.e., the cognitive limits of reasoning) affects the incentive mechanism design in multimedia crowdsourcing systems. In the fully rational benchmark case, we derived the requester's optimal rewards and quality requirements, as well as the workers' Nash equilibrium selections. Due to the high computational complexity in the heterogeneous workers' case, we proposed a low-complexity heuristic algorithm to compute the near-optimal solution. In the bounded rational case, we modeled the workers' belief formation and progressive decision process based on the cognitive hierarchy theory in behavioral economics. We analyzed how the requester can improve her profit by taking advantage of the workers' imperfect reasoning. Simulation results showed that the requester is more likely to obtain a higher profit under a larger worker population with a lower average cognitive level.
For the future work, we will consider the impact of bounded cognitive rationality in more practical system scenarios. For example, it is interesting to consider rewards that depend on both the workers' sensing efforts and quality capabilities, and worker costs that are both task and worker dependent. Also, we will conduct field trials to validate our theory, e.g., estimating the value of average cognitive level τ for different types of crowdsourcing applications.
